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Competing Models in Russia's Civic Education

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The political nature of curriculum determines the scale, depth and intensity of curricular reforms in the first decades of the twenty-first century. Driven by ideologies, national, regional, or even local, curriculum represents the intersection of socially constructed meanings, emotional aspirations, and power (McLaren 1989). Like every programmatic reflective text, curriculum is highly ambiguous. It should demonstrate a traditionalistic consistency to preserve social cohesiveness; and it should normally pave the way to new societal, political, and ideological goals. Therefore, curricular reform is a euphemism that obscures (or reveals) tectonic shifts in a society where those shifts are a reaction to external or internal challenges.

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, two such challenges, among others, have influenced curricular reform in the Russian Federation. With the re-emergence of an independent Russia, a new state, ideologically and politically, emerged and distanced itself from the former Soviet Union by positioning itself as a new republic adherent to the democratic development. Nation-building and identity construction were among major governmental political concerns. Thus, nation-building rationale dictated the context, conditions, and priorities of education reforms that were launched immediately after 1991, particularly a reform in civic education. However, it is worth noting that the nation-state is no longer the sole repository of citizenship. If we accept a nation’s imaginary status (Anderson 1991; Zajda 2009), why would we assume that a nation-state or the national citizenship model is less vulnerable or less susceptible to changes? The term nation-building presents an interesting example of syntactic dichotomy: on the one hand, the nation-building process, as the term implies, aims at building a nation; on the other, due to its ideological nature, nation-building is an endless process whose ultimate goal, a nation, never takes a final shape. That is why history, or rather mythology, from which political leaders usually draw inspiration, is so carefully monitored and constructed to make sure that ‘a continuous process of redefinition, revision, reinterpretation, and rewriting of historical narratives’ (Zajda 2009: 4) is under control. Russia, which recently has experienced contradictory reforms in civic education, is not an exception here.

The second challenge that the Russian Federation faced was globalization, which deeply influenced the school reform development: it unexpectedly generated new discourses and discovered a never-seen-before multiplicity of truth. Debates about
globalization, curriculum, and pedagogy magnified through the metaphorically constructed reality, revealed the centrality of properly negotiated terms and meanings as well as the importance of culture, both political and imaginary-traditional, or the lack thereof in our understanding of citizenship. Globalization has profoundly influenced the very notion of citizenship and citizenship education rationales by not only infusing a more distinct global perspective but also by challenging the core principles of citizenship as an idiosyncratically nation or nation-state related concept. The routine of permanency particularly for the citizens of the 'unbreakable' Soviet Union, turned into the chaos of the centrifugal proliferation of interpretation and genres' overnight (Matus and McCarthy 2003). Suddenly, people discovered that the world was no longer monochromatic, and even more disturbing was the fact that it had never been monochromatic. Therefore, survival in this new era required people to acquire new knowledge, to learn and to practice new skills, and to carefully re-examine their values. The most challenging curricular task in this new environment was to develop the ability to deconstruct previously unquestioned assumptions (Smith 2003) in order to reconstruct and eventually to renegotiate newly contextualized meanings.

During its short post-Soviet history since 1991, Russia witnessed two competing curricular models, namely liberal and traditional, which followed one another, and mirrored two distinct social and economic developmental models during the last decade of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century. Both models are Russia's response to the two major challenges that I have mentioned earlier: construction of the new identity and globalization. The choices are highly reflective and demonstrative of the type of citizens that the ruling elite intended to educate. Due to specific features of the contemporary political system and the state of democratic development in the Russian Federation, it seems problematic to argue that curricular reforms, including those in citizenship education, are dictated by the needs of society. Rather, the changes in civic education in the last decade appear to have been determined by ideological intents. This, in a broader perspective, once again, poses a question of the role of schooling and curricula in social and political reforms, particularly at the most decisive moments of a nation's history. Thus, civic education that is particularly susceptible to even miniscule shifts in ideological and political paradigms, found itself at the very intersection of organic needs of society and individual political ambitions.

Very few aspects of civic education have recently drawn so much attention by government officials and practical educators as patriotic education. The state program *Patriotic Education of the Citizens of the Russian Federation for Years 2001–2005* (Gosudarstvennaya programma 2001) adopted by the government in 2001, was soon followed by the development of a new conception of patriotic education in 2003 (Kontseptsia 2003). A new state program for the years 2006–2010 (Gosudarstvennaya programma 2005) passed by the Russian government in 2005 was aimed at providing a smooth transition from the outdated program to a newer one and adjustments of patriotic education to new conditions in Russia. This alone demonstrates special government attention to patriotic education of Russian citizens. Together with numerous local educational programs in Russia's regions, this campaign presents one of the most intensive patriotic education campaigns in
Russian history. This obviously heightened official attention to patriotic education starkly contrasts with the more liberal model of civic education of the 1990s. Observers noted that the educational reform of the early 1990s to humanize, democratize, and decentralize schools in Russia, drastically changed its direction (Ioffe 2006) and now the new model aims at the promotion and restoration of some of the Soviet features, including ‘centralized control, curricular rigidity and political-ideological functions’ (Karpov and Lisovskaya 2005: 23). They argue that restoration of military education and focus on patriotic education are vivid signs of stylistic re-Sovietization.

This chapter will demonstrate that the focus on patriotic metaphor narrative, the infusion of patriotic discourse in civic curriculum and the revitalization of the Soviet-style military rationale are attempts to expeditiously solve the problem of new civic identity and, at the same time, are a traditionalistic counter-reaction to radical political processes on Russia’s borders (‘colored revolutions’ in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan). Historical prerequisites of patriotic education in Russia and recent tendencies in political discourses as they are articulated through official texts will be analyzed. The chapter concludes that patriotic, military, and to some extent nationalistic components have become dominant in contemporary civic curriculum in Russia. It also argues that patriotism that is conceptualized through a traditionalist framework does not leave much room for critical thinking and decision-making techniques that are central to democratic citizenship education.

**Patriotism and Patriotic Education in the Soviet Union: Brief Overview**

‘Patriotism plays the role of the most reactionary ideology, whose function is to justify imperialist bestiality and to deaden the class consciousness of the proletariat, by setting impassable boundaries to its struggle for liberation’ stated the Soviet Encyclopedia of State and Law in 1925 (Barghoorn 1956: 12). The Bolshevik attitude to patriotism was conditioned by the Marxist dictum that the proletariat does not have a homeland. This vulgar cosmopolitanism was based on the idea that the proletariat is exploited everywhere and, therefore, cannot be attached to any state or locality. ‘Whoever in this war [World War I] accepts defense of the fatherland becomes an accomplice of his “own” national bourgeoisie’ wrote Lenin in winter of 1917 (Lenin 1917/1964: 254). However, following the same logic, after the Bolsheviks seized power, patriotism gradually became introduced into the paradigm of new values in the form of Soviet or socialist patriotism.

The new concept of Soviet patriotism became particularly popular among ideologues in the late 1920s and early 1930s when the Soviet officials realized the futility of attempting to ignite the world proletarian revolution. The Stalin government and local authorities skillfully used the mobilizing effect of patriotic campaigns to successfully conduct domestic and international policies: manipulations with Soviet patriotism assisted in recruiting thousands of volunteers for gigantic industrialization projects. At the same time, it allowed condemnation of political opponents during the staged government-orchestrated political trials. It is symptomatic that the official educational journal Sovetskaya Pedagogika (Soviet
Education Science) published a number of articles about patriotic education in its first issues in 1937 (Shchygolev 2007).

Changes in the centralized national school curriculum also reflected the emergence of patriotism as one of the central ideological concepts. Historians agree that Soviet patriotism was a proxy of Russian nationalism (Laqueur 1998). Many political figures and heroes from Russian history, who had previously been erased, were rehabilitated; Russian History became a mandatory course in all schools of the multiethnic Soviet Union, and Arabic or Latin alphabets that were traditionally used by many non-Slavic languages were substituted by Cyrillic. At the same time, most innovations that had been characteristic of the new Soviet school in the 1920s (Counts 1957; Dewey 1929; Nearing 1926) were terminated. Curricular reforms in the early 1930s were conducted along with the adoption of an updated and renewed version of the State Patriotism policy (Rapoport 2009; Yekhelchyk 2002) that originated in the first half of the nineteenth century in Imperial Russia. In 1833, Count Sergei Uvarov, the new Minister of Education in Nicolas I’s government, coined the tripartite formula of autocracy, orthodoxy, nationality which became an ideological doctrine that dominated the reign of Nicolas I and later Alexander III and Nicolas II (Riasanovsky 1967). This formula provided a rationale for the Russian Idea which is seen by some as purely a Russian messianic imperative that holds a range of discourses and narratives, in which Russian collective identity has been contested, constructed, and reproduced for centuries (Bouweng 2008). Ironically, only 27 years after condemning patriotism as ‘reactionary ideology that ... justifies imperialist bestiality’ (Barghoorn 1956: 12), Soviet patriotism was defined as ‘the marvelous fusion of the progressive national traditions of the peoples with the common vital interests of all the toilers of the USSR’ (Matyushkin quoted in Barghoorn 1956: 9). This definition of 1952 best reveals the true nature and origin of Soviet patriotism. The party leaders created and used Soviet patriotism for the purpose of ideological, political, and social changes to maintain the status quo by conducting various well-planned propagandistic campaigns under the motto of patriotism that solely served their short- or long-term needs.

Despite the hardly-masked Slavophile and Russia-centered focus of patriotic education, a specific feature of Soviet patriotism and patriotic education in the Soviet Union was the concentration on the military component in patriotic discourses rather than nationalistic. The nation-building as well as social identity construction rationales appeared secondary to the military rationale that dominated patriotic discourses and took a lion’s share of civic curriculum. The reason was in the fact that unlike patriotic sentiments elsewhere, Soviet patriotism discourses were more ideologically determined rather than nationally or ethnically (Vaillant 2005). Questionable nationality policies and the status of a nation with an unpredicted history left very little room for the Soviet-era mythology to support patriotic sentiments. Therefore, suitable major historic events, such as the participation and the victory of the Soviet Union in World War II, which is officially called in Russia the Great Patriotic War, or the flight of the first cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin, were usually used in the Soviet Union as a framework for civic and patriotic education. Another challenge of Soviet patriotism was its limited time
functionality: due to its heavily political and ideological content, Soviet patriotism meant unquestionable love of the Soviet Union that was founded in December 1922. As for its predecessor, the Russian Empire, Soviet citizens were supposed to be more selective in the display of their patriotic sentiments.

Theoretically and practically, patriotic education was always perceived in the Soviet Union as military–patriotic education. Very often these two terms were used interchangeably. This fusion was achieved through an uncritical analysis of military operations conducted by the Soviet Union in the courses of History or Literature, compulsory military training in high school, and numerous extra-curricular activities that included national military games, meetings with war veterans and acting military, festivals of military songs, etc. (Bodrova 2008; Shchygolev 2007; Sredin 1988; Zajda 2007). Hence, the Soviet Union’s patriotic education paradigm was primarily concentrated on instilling political phraseology and on militarizing citizen consciousness. Thus, the ‘love of one’s Socialist Motherland’ was translated in practical educational discourses into curricular and extra-curricular activities whose objectives were: (a) to construct and develop Soviet civic identity, (b) to teach unequivocal commitment to the Communist Party and ruling regime, and (c) to mobilize and train warriors who will unquestionably follow military orders.

Civic and Patriotic Education in Contemporary Russia: Two Models

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the demise of the one-party and one-state-ideology system marked a new stage in Russia’s history and led to new radical changes in education. In these circumstances, civic education came to the forefront of reforms. New tasks to educate free democratically-minded citizens of a new democratic society resulted in significant changes in civic curriculum (Eklof and Dneprov 1993; Froumin 2004; 2005). It should be noted that Russian educational tradition maintains that the process of education consists of two separate but interdependent components: academic education (obucheniye) and moral or character education (vospitaniye). Civic education was an integral part of both components: it was normally provided through a number of academic courses (e.g. History, Study of Society, Literature) and through the system of extracurricular activities that were a part of vospitaniye. After 1991, a number of new courses in civic education were developed and added to civic academic curriculum (Froumin 2004; Vaillant 2005). New interactive methods of teaching became increasingly popular among educators. Extracurricular work became less political and more creative. More and more innovative schools that were called laboratory schools appeared all over Russia. The new openness helped Russia’s education to become more susceptible to global changes. Attention was directed to instill ‘common human values’. It was a time of close cooperation with civic educators from Europe and the United States. The priorities of civic education were to educate a democratic, knowledgeable citizen who will be concerned about the well-being of the country and the world and who will work to continue the democratic development of Russia. Patriotism, as it followed from the school
reform documents, was interpreted as aspiration to build a democratic Russia that will be successfully integrated in the new global system.

Despite the enthusiasm and creativity of many teachers, the problems and unresolved issues, some of them very specific, continued to accumulate. One such specific problem was the teaching of History: old Soviet textbooks were no longer used, new textbooks were not published. Many teachers were disoriented in the tide of new and mostly sensational information that inundated TV and printed media (Lisovskaya and Karpov 1999; Zajda 1994; 2007). For many educators, who were primarily trained in Soviet teacher-training colleges, it was very difficult to change their teaching style (Polozhevik, Schechter, and Perelmuter 1997). That was particularly true for social science teachers, who were trained as ‘(Communist) Party policy forerunners’. Slow political and social progress, a deep crisis in economy, and predictably frail support of painful reforms led to changes in the ruling elite in the late 1990s. A new developmental model was based on a more traditionalistic conservative approach where populist patriotic rhetoric played a critical role.

It is not at all surprising that the intensification of patriotic rhetoric on a governmental level, as well as on government-controlled television and in media, led to a surge of patriotism and patriotic education related texts in mainstream educational journals. Interpreted through the terms that spanned across the whole political and ideological spectrum from almost extreme left to extreme right, the conceptualization of patriotism reflected the existing dichotomy deeply enrooted in Russian culture and mentality (Arkhipenkova 2004). However, despite few attempts to address various aspects of patriotism from critical-analytical standpoints (Bolshakov 2004; Galkin 2005; Grigoryev 2005; Ioffe 2006), mainstream political, sociological and educational journals focused on such traditional for Russia aspects of patriotism as love to one’s fatherland, pride in one’s fatherland, devotion, sometimes sacred, to one’s fatherland, and commitment to serve its interests (Bykov 2006a; 2006b; Ivanova 2003; Lutovinov 2006; Mikryukov 2007; Pulyayev and Shelyapin 2001). Patriotism is a traditional Russian moral value that instills the patriotic idea of ‘a spiritual unity of a person and the Russian society’, contended Pulyayev and Shelyapin (2001: 71) who specifically pointed at the incompatibility of patriotism and nationalism or cosmopolitanism. That was a remarkable note considering traditional negative attitudes to constantly vilified cosmopolitanism and a hardly concealed similarity between state-supported patriotism and growing nationalism.

Ivanova (2003) argued that state patriotism plays the most important consolidating role in a society. When the state is the object of patriotic sentiments and the people are subjects, patriotism is an expression of subjects' pride for the Fatherland, their active participation in consolidation and strengthening the state and statehood for the purpose of efficient functioning of social institutions, development of the society and individuals' (2003: 295). Thus, state patriotism, Ivanova concluded, can become the leading consolidating idea of the official policy. Patriotism as a developmental process goes through three stages (Mikryukov 2007): love of one's family and relatives, love of one's 'little Motherland' (which is euphemistically used for the birthplace), and love of one's Fatherland and
society. Analyzing relations between patriotism and citizenship in the framework of civic-patriotic education, Lutovinov (2006) asserted that compared with the vague, blurred, and badly defined concept of citizenship, patriotism is a clear and theoretically better developed construct that represents a unity of spirituality, civic maturity, and social activity. These qualities motivate the individual to serve the fatherland. He then made a very symptomatic statement that patriotism, not citizenship, should be a leading component of civic-patriotic education because ‘overestimation of citizenship that assumes depatriotization of education of citizens, is a deformation unacceptable for the state, society as well as for the individual whose ultimate predestination is to serve their Fatherland’ (2006: 54).

It is important to understand that the program of patriotic education in Russia was planned as a ubiquitous national campaign that encompasses all spheres traditionally responsible for moral and ideological development of the Russian society. What impelled the Russian government to launch this campaign? Why now? The official documents, such as the state programs *Patriotic Education of Citizens of the Russian Federation* (Gosudarstvennaya Programma 2001), or *Conception of Patriotic Education of Citizens of the Russian Federation* (Kontseptsiya 2003) briefly explain that ‘economic disintegration, social differentiation of the society, devaluation of spiritual (moral) values negatively effected public consciousness … Apathy, selfishness, individualism, cynicism, unmotivated aggressiveness, disrespect to the state and social institutions have become widespread phenomena in public consciousness. State and military services tend to be less prestigious’ (Gosudarstvennaya Programma 2001). All these, the program states, are the results of elusive ‘events of the recent time’. Blame for the ‘present state’ (a usual euphemistic substitute for ‘bad’ or ‘inappropriate’) of patriotism and patriotic education is usually attributed to: (1) deheroization of Russian history, (2) humiliation of Russian national dignity, (3) prioritizing universal human values over national values (Ivanova 2003), (4) neglect of military training (Bykov 2006a; Lesnyak 2005; Lutovinov 2006), and (5) deideologization of the Russian youth (Karpelman 2002). Those who are familiar with the content of Russian political discourses are very well aware that the ideologically loaded grandiloquent constructs, such as deheroization, deideologization, or universal human values, are metaphors or coded ‘stigmas’ of a very concrete period of Russian history, namely the end of the 1980s and 1990s or in other words, the post-Soviet period when a liberal-democratic model was being implemented in politics and education. If properly contextualized and decoded, deheroization would mean a process of demythologization of Russian and Soviet history, a painful process of rationalizing historic events. Deideologization, in turn, stands for the attempts to find and to instill in the society paradigms of interpersonal and inter-institutional relations that would be based on common sense devoid of Communist rhetoric. Hence, what we witness here is an attempt to use patriotic sentiments substituted by the policy of State Patriotism against the feeble liberal reforms of the 1990s.

The intensification of patriotic education is also explained by ethnic and civic identity crises in Russian society (Blum 2006; Pulyayev and Shelyapin 2001; Vaillant 2005). Traditionally, people in the Soviet Union or in Russia self-identify ethnically rather than civically. When Leonid Brezhnev bombastically declared
in 1972 that a new ethno-political community ‘Soviet people’ was created, it was perceived by the majority of the population, Russian and non-Russian alike, as usual official propaganda, produced in abundance in Brezhnev’s Soviet Union. The term ‘Soviet’, as a civic identifier, obviously existed and was frequently used in the Soviet Union; however, it almost never substituted for an ethnic self-identifier of Russians or representatives of any other ethnic groups. The democratic model that was used in the 1990s proved impotent to quickly form a new civic identity. It would be naïve to expect otherwise considering the problems that Russia faced in the 1990s. Often media and officials of various ranks pointed at the crisis of self-identity among Russians as one of the major threats to the moral health and stability of the society. Statistical data demonstrated the relative success of the traditionalist-patriotic approach. According to the poll conducted by Levada Center, 80 percent of the population of Russia always or in most cases identified themselves as Russians in 1994, by 2003 this number had increased to 90 percent (Levada 2005). It remains problematic for English speakers to comprehend this problem, because the English language does not differentiate between the two distinct concepts of Russkiy, that is to say a Russian as (self-)identified by ethnic origin, versus Rossiyanin, Russian by civic-formal attribution or a Russian Federation citizen, but not necessarily ethnically Russian. However, it should be noted that the propagandistic patriotic campaign, particularly on state-controlled TV channels and in media, was based on the principles of so-called loyal or blind patriotism (Merry 2009; Staub 1997), when Russia was counter-opposed to the West. Obviously, the mobilizing effect of patriotic discourses in mass-media and in school curriculum produced a prompt unifying effect. However, it remains to be determined whether this effect is positive or negative in the long run.

Another reason for launching the patriotic campaign was the impact of global political and economic processes, particularly the fear that the effect of so-called ‘Colored Revolutions’ (the Rose Revolution in 2003 in Georgia, the Orange Revolution in 2004 in Ukraine, and the Tulip Revolution in 2005 in Kyrgyzstan) will transcend the borders of the Russian Federation. Politically, the reasons for and the development of all Colored Revolutions are ambiguous; however they resulted in preventing or ending authoritarian regimes in their countries (Forbrig and Demes 2007; Tucker 2007). The intensification of patriotic campaigns in Russia in response to the Colored Revolutions brings a historical parallel with the similar actions of Nicolas I who was afraid to ‘catch a French disease’, his definition of the French Revolution, and whose new policy of State Patriotism was a direct reaction to European revolutionary movements.

The official institutionalized approach to patriotism and patriotic education is best presented in the *Conception of Patriotic Education of the Citizens of Russian Federation*, adopted by the government in 2003 (Kontseptsiya 2003). The document that claims to ‘reflect the whole complex of officially acknowledged ideas’ about patriotic education, unequivocally defines patriotism as ‘love to one’s Motherland, commitment to one’s Fatherland, strong desire to serve its interests, and readiness to defend it, even if it requires self-sacrifice’ (2003: 2). According to the Conception, patriotism is a specific type of self-realization and social behavior of citizens that are determined by the protection of the unity and sovereignty of Russia the lat indivic need o Russia of the during to state of pat: a ‘set as well height consti docun deicar sympt narrat menti outco can b patrio insign tradf Th for Ye and g of me simile state-the pr de vel that t prom educ all ar on el orga way : such mass again Ti strict Vlad politi
of Russia, its national security, stable development, duty, and responsibility. By the latter the authors understand the priority of public and state interests over individual and personal interests. The specific features of patriotism in Russia identified by the Conception – togetherness, integrality, obedience to the laws, need of collectiveness – remarkably resonate with the basic principles of the famous Russian triad of autocracy, orthodoxy, nationality that constituted the quintessence of the policy of State Patriotism in the second quarter of the nineteenth century during the reign of Nicolas I. In general, the emphasis on the overall subordination to state interests at the expense of individual interests is idiosyncratic to the concept of patriotism as well as the idea of patriotic education, which is interpreted as a set of systematic and goal-oriented activities of state bodies and institutions as well as public organizations aimed at forming and inculcating in citizens heightened patriotic consciousness ..., readiness to carry out one's civic duty, and constitutional obligations to defend the interests of the Motherland' (2003: 4). The document specifically accentuates a military component in patriotic education, declaring military education an inseparable part of patriotic education. It is symptomatic that the Conception, which is presented as a traditionalist type of narrative that internalizes uncritical loyalty to the nation and the state, still twice mentions 'civil society' as one of the beneficiaries of proper patriotic education outcomes. Although the text does not clarify how the development of civil society can benefit from a hyper-centralized and ideologically conservative system of patriotic education, the very reference to it is indicative of possible shifts, however insignificant they might be, in the rationale of value-related education among traditionalists in Russia.

The state program Patriotic Education of Citizens of the Russian Federation for Years 2006–2010 (Gosudarstvennaya Programma 2005) is based on the ideas and goals set out in the Conception of Patriotic Education of 2003 and, in terms of methods and approaches, is the continuation of the previously passed and similarly entitled program for years 2001–2005. Although symbolic in nature (the state-funded budget portion of the five-year program was less than $20 million), the program is very eloquent in categorizing and indicating the general ideological development direction in Russia and patriotic education in particular. Claiming that the ultimate goal of patriotic education is the revival of Russia's greatness and prominence, the program postulates state activities that would enhance patriotic education including such elements as: an increase of military components in all areas of education, more careful attention to history textbooks, influence on electronic and printed media, and assuming more control over children's organizations. In reality, the tasks outlined by the program have been long underway. Examples are plentiful: from secretly supported puppet youth organizations, such as the infamous Nashi movement, to multiple orchestrated campaigns in mass media against Russia's neighbors that create a sensation of a world conspiracy against Russia.

The most recent example is the campaign to put history education under strict government control. At a meeting with educators in June 2007 President Vladimir Putin labeled the texts about World War II that included criticism of the political or military actions of the USSR 'inadmissible and even insulting for our
people's interpretation of history' (Sokolov 2007). He also blamed those who used international grants to create history textbooks and requested the writing of new textbooks. This initiative was immediately supported by the Russian parliament whose Speaker announced that a new bill would require official state registration of history textbooks. This means that the government will carefully verify and control all textual content. Besides, the number of history textbooks that teachers can use in classrooms will be limited and only a few state-endorsed publishers will be allowed to publish approved textbooks. The history revision campaign logically continued in May 2009 when the new Russian President Dmitry Medvedyev signed an executive order that established a presidential commission 'to oppose attempts to falsify history to the detriment of Russia's history' (Novosyolova 2009). These examples once again demonstrate the key role of control over history teaching in 'repositioning competing and ideologically driven discourses of historical narratives and processes' (Zajda 2009: 4).

In discussing the rationale and motivations behind the ongoing amplification of official activities in patriotic education and the infusion of additional patriotic discourses in civic curriculum, observers often refer to poll results that demonstrate an increasing interest in patriotic education among the population of Russia. In 2004, 89 percent of respondents agreed that it was necessary to devote greater attention to patriotic education (Blum 2006). A more recent poll in November 2006 indicated that 93 percent of respondents agreed that schools and colleges should engage in the patriotic education of youth (VTsIOM 2006). However compelling these numbers are, they should be viewed with skepticism and caution. The survey conducted in February 2007 by the same state-run All-Russia Central Institute of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) indicated that only 12 percent of the respondents would advise the state to conduct patriotic education in educational establishments of various levels (VTsIOM 2007). Ironically, less than 5 percent of respondents would recommend the state to conduct the activities that are pinnacles in the state program of patriotic education. Despite the fact that 30 percent of respondents said that various formal events are important for patriotic education, only 3–4 percent admitted participating in those events while 86 percent reported that neither they nor members of their families ever participated in any of such events.

**Patriotic Education or Military-Patriotic Education?**

The most conspicuous feature of the contemporary patriotic education campaign is probably its military spirit. Ironically, the adjective 'military' is used only three times in the text of the Program of 2006–2010 compared with 22 times in the text of the Program of 2001–2005 (both texts are almost similar in length). Nonetheless, whether the word 'military' is formally mentioned or not, the term 'patriotic education' by itself is a code phrase that implies military education, military training, and military preparation. Thus, it is not surprising that all or almost all materials about patriotic education or the implementation of the newly adopted program include information about the military or examples of military training. By 2006, there were 1,350 youth military clubs with membership of
more than 300,000. Russian military established cooperation with 1,130 military-patriotic clubs and organizations; there were 452 summer military camps in all regions of Russia (Surzhko 2006). There are literally hundreds and hundreds of regular propagandistic campaigns conducted at national, regional, and local levels. The list of examples of militarization of consciousness is long and almost emulates, stylistically and operationally, activities and programs from patriotic education curricula of the Soviet period (Sredin 1988; Vyrschikov 1990). This striking resemblance to the Soviet period curricula explains why everyone in Russia perceives patriotic education as a rationale with a dominating military agenda. The term that is commonly used in the Soviet Union for patriotic education was 'military-patriotic education'. Therefore, the military rationale of the patriotic education campaign does not need to be explicitly explained or clarified: the mutually shared codes 'patriotism' or 'patriotic education' are normally 'correctly' decoded by educators. The centuries-long tradition of 'military/patriotic' symbiotic unity also explains the fact that almost 75 percent of respondents related patriotic education to military games or military clubs and camps (VTsIOM 2007).

**Final Thoughts**

The question every nation faces regarding civic education is essentially what kind of citizen the society needs. This question is rhetorical because every society needs citizens who act for the progress of the society. But who defines progress? A recent survey conducted among civic educators in various parts of Russia demonstrated that the majority selected patriotism as the most important civic concept. Rights and freedoms were ranked second, rule of law sixth, freedom was ranked tenth, and democracy, which received only a fifth of the votes given to patriotism, was ranked twelfth (Ioffe 2006; 2009). These data together with the Levada Center research presented earlier in this chapter (Levada 2005) and the results of other surveys (Russian Center for Citizenship Education 2008) evidence that the developers of the patriotic campaigns almost achieved the desired results. But are these the results that the democratic reforms of the early 1990s intended to achieve? The ubiquitous patriotic campaign that was supposed to be a part of civic curriculum but in reality substituted the civic curriculum (Semko 2007) was planned as a response to the challenges of globalization and Russian civic and ethnic identity construction. Ironically, the two concepts that were rarely identified by surveyed social science teachers were self-identification and globalization (Ioffe 2009).

Curriculum, as a political text, reflects societal political intent only in societies where there are mechanisms that guarantee the influence of rank-and-file members of those societies on school reform. Proper democratic procedures provide opportunities for all interested members of a society to voice their opinions and to reflect their concerns in curricula. In the societies where citizens are disengaged from decision making, curricular policies, particularly in such sensitive area as civic education, turn into campaigns that serve the interests of those in power, rather than for the overall development of society. Rather than using the challenges of globalization to deconstruct, reinterpret, and eventually renegotiate old assumptions through civic curriculum, Russian officials substituted public
debates of real controversies by traditionalistic metaphors and symbols that only postponed but did not resolve real problems of identity and socialization. Patriotic and military emphases in educational discourses contextualized through the Soviet era codes and symbols are not simply a stylistic move to a conservative stage of educational reform in Russia (Karpov and Lisovskaya 2005) but rather a sign of a deeper involvement of the state, not citizens, in civic education processes to shape, control, and eventually sustain the chosen ideological framework. The current development of patriotic education in Russia is the continuation of the long-standing tradition to silence critical reconceptualization of civic constructs through the means of education. Furthermore, the re-institutionalization of the State Patriotism policy is no longer symbolic, but a real departure from the liberal democratic changes of the 1990s that contradicts the stated objectives of educational reform and might eventually hamper the development of a democratic school system in Russia and slow down the creation of Russia’s civil society.

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